




When Owners Play the Stackelberg Game
??????? ?
We consider delegation model with heterogeneous goods and when
owners play the Stackelberg game. The original delegation model showed
the rationale of the divergence of owners and managers in modern ¯rms.
However, when the goods are substitutes, to employ managers is not a
good policy for the owner to maximize pro¯t. Owners should employ
managers only when the goods are complements. Even if we consider
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p1 = 1¡ x1 ¡ µx2; (1)
p2 = 1¡ µx1 ¡ x2; (2)
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?????????? Delegation ???
????x1 ? x2 ?????? 1?2??????????????????
???p1 ? p2 ???????µ ? ¡1 < µ < 1?????????????
µ > 0??????????????µ < 0???????????????
R1 = p1x1; (3)
R2 = p2x2; (4)
???????
¼1 = R1 ¡ cx1; (5)
¼2 = R2 ¡ cx2; (6)
??? c????? 1???????????????????????? 2
???????????????? 1?2????????????????
????? (7)?(8)??????????????????
w1 = ¸1R1 + (1¡ ¸1)¼1; (7)
w2 = ¸2R2 + (1¡ ¸2)¼2; (8)
??? ¸1?¸1 ? 0 · ¸1 · 1?0 · ¸2 · 1??????? 1?2??????
???????? 1?2??????? 1?2????? (7)?(8)?????
??????? x1?x2 ??????
????????? delegation????? 2?????????????
??? 1??????????????? ¸1?¸2 ?????? 2?????
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II-1. ????? 2??????????
? 2???????????? Nash?????????? 1? (7)??
????????????????????????? x1 ????????
????????? 2? (8)?????????????? x1 ??????





(1¡ c+ c¸1 ¡ µx2)
2
; (9)




= 0???, (4), (6)?
?? (8)?????????????
x2 =





(1¡ c)(2¡ µ) + c(2¸1 ¡ µ¸2)
4¡ µ2 ; (11)
xMN2 =




































? 1??????? 1? 2?????????????????????
¸1?¸2 ??????? 1?2??????????¸1 ??? ¸2 ??????
???????????????????????? 1?2? Nash????
??????















f(1¡ c)(2¡ µ)¡ cµ¸1g µ2
4c(2¡ µ2) (16)






c(µ2 ¡ 2µ ¡ 4) (17)
??????
¸N1 ??????1?????????????(17)? ¡1 < µ < 1???
? µ ????????????
¡(1¡ c)µ2
c(µ2 ¡ 2µ ¡ 4) < 1????????
1
2












(µ2 ¡ 2µ ¡ 4)2 (19)
????





(2¡ µ)2(2 + µ)2 < 0 ?????????????
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II-3. ??????????????????
??????????????? (13)?(14)? ¸i = 0; i = 1; 2?????
¦1(0; 0) = ¦2(0; 0) =
f(1¡ c)(2¡ µ)g2






2 )¡¦i(0; 0) = ¡(1¡ c)
2(4 + 3µ)µ3








? 1???????????? Nash ???µ > 0?
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?????????? Delegation ???
? 1??????????µ > 0???????????????????
? EO ?????????????????? Nash??? EMN ????
??Reji ; i = 1; 2; j = O;M ?????????????? O??????
??????????????ReOi ???? i?? 2??????????
????? i????????????ReMi ??????????????
? i?????????? 2??????? i?????????¼i; i = 1; 2,
????????????wi; i = 1; 2,????????? ?? 1?????
¼1 ??????????????????????? ?? 2????? ¼2
???????????????????????????????????





? ¸i; i = 1; 2????????????????????? Stackelberg?
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????? 1?????????????
? Nash?? EMN ????????????????? EO ???????
???????EMN ? EO ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????
??????????µ < 0?????????????????? ReMi
??????????????????????????????????
ReOi ????????????????????? 1 ?????????
¼1
J ; j = O;M;??????????????????? 2???????
??? ¼2j ????????????????
? 2???????EMN ????EO ????????????
?????? 1???? 2????? 1????????????Stackelberg
???????????????????????
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? 2 ????????µ < 0?
III. ??????????? Stackelberg??
???????? 1? Stackelberg??????????????????













(1¡ c)µ2(4¡ 2µ ¡ µ2)
c(4¡ µ2)(4¡ 3µ2) (22)
????¸L1 ??????? L?????????(22)? (16)?????
¸F2 =
(1¡ c)µ2(µ3 ¡ 4µ2 ¡ 4µ + 8)
2c(4¡ µ2)(4¡ 3µ2) (23)
????¸F2 ?????? F??????????0 · ¸L1 · 1 and 0 · ¸F2 · 1
???? ¡1 · µ · 1???????? µ ????????????????
0 · ¸L1 · 1????? µ ????????????






(2¡ µ)(2 + µ)(4¡ 3µ2)c2







???????(23)?????? ¸F2 ??????0 · ¸F2 · 1? µ ? ¡1 ·
















(1¡ c)2(µ2 + 2µ ¡ 4)2






(1¡ c)2(2¡ µ2)(µ3 ¡ 4µ2 ¡ 4µ + 8)2








2 )¡¦1(¸N1 ; ¸N2 ) = (1¡ c)
2µ8









2 )¡¦2(¸N1 ; ¸N2 ) = (1¡ c)
2µ5(2¡ µ2)(µ5 ¡ 12µ4 + 64µ2 ¡ 64)
2(µ2 ¡ 2µ ¡ 4)2(4¡ µ2)2(4¡ 3µ2)2












2 )¡¦2(¸L1 ; ¸F2 ) = (1¡ c)
2µ5(5µ3 ¡ 4µ3 ¡ 16µ + 16)
4(4¡ µ2)2(4¡ 3µ2)2





2 )¡¦2(¸L1 ; ¸F2 ) > (<)0( µ > 0; (µ < 0) (29)
???????????????????????? ¦1(0; 0);¦2(0; 0), ??
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2 )¡¦1(0; 0) = (1¡c)
2µ3(¡8+6µ+µ2)







2 )¡¦1(0; 0) = (1¡ c)
2(4 + 3µ)µ3
(2+µ)2(µ2¡2µ¡4)2 > (<)0 ( µ > 0; (µ < 0)
(31)
????





2 )??? ¦1(¸N1 ; ¸N2 ) = ¦2(¸N1 ; ¸N2 ):??????????
























































O = ¦1(0; 0) = ¦2(0; 0) (34)
?????????????(30)?(31)??????? 2???????
?? 2?????????? ¦O > ¦L > ¦N > ¦F ???????????
¦F > ¦L > ¦N > ¦O ????
? 3???? 4?????? 2???????????????????
??? 1??? Stackelberg???????????? 2?????????
???¸ 1 ?????? ¸2 ???? ¦2(¸1; ¸2)????????????(16)
???????????? ¸2 =




?????x1 ¡ x2 ??????????????Nash??? x1 ??? x2
??? (11)?(12)?????? 2????? (16)?
x2 =
¡2µ





(35)????????? 3, 4??????? 2????? (35)? EM ??
ES ?????????????????????????????????
??? (35)? Nash??? EM ????????????????????
????????????????? 2????????? 1??????




µ > 0????????????????? 3??????????? 2
????? (35)????? 2????? ReM2 ??????????5)??




??????????????? ¼ML1 ? (35) ?????????????
????¼ML1 ? ¼MN1 ???????????????¼O1 ???????
?????????? ¼O1 > ¼ML1 > ¼MN1 ??????????? 2 ??
????? 3?????????????????¼O2 ?¼MN2 ?¼MF2 ????








µ < 0????????????????????????? 2????? (35)
???? 1????????? 4?? EMS ?????????? xL1 ; xF2 ??
???xL1 > xF2 ?????????????????????? 1??????
5) ReM2 ???? 2 ?????????(35) ???? 2 ??????????????????
???????
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¼ML1 ? ¼MN1 ???????????????? 2?????? ¼MF2 ? ¼MN2
??????????????¼MN1 = ¼MN2 ??????¼MF2 > ¼ML1 ??
?????????????? 4???????¼MFi > ¼MLi > ¼MNi > ¼Oi
? 3????????? Nash ????? Stackelberg ???µ > 0?





























6) ?? 2 ????? ¦ ????????? ¼ ??????????????????????
???????????????????????
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